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ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND THE SOCIAL LEGITIMACY  
OF CLASS ACTIONS 
DAVID MARCUS †
 
 
In response to Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too 
Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043 (2010). 
 
Do class action lawyers make too little?  For many, one might as 
well inquire into the Pope’s religious affiliation, or whether the Cubs 
have a chance at winning the World Series.  To Brian Fitzpatrick, 
however, the conventional answer—no—is wrong.  In an arresting ar-
ticle, he makes a utilitarian argument for why plaintiffs’ lawyers often 
should receive a much higher share of a class’s recovery than they pre-
sently do.1
Fitzpatrick contends with justification that courts lack a normative 
metric to determine attorneys’ fees in class actions.
 
2  Unprincipled fee 
awards trouble him because he believes that courts systematically un-
dercompensate plaintiffs’ lawyers in “small-stakes” class suits in which 
each class member has “only a few dollars or a few hundred dollars” in 
potential damages.3  These cases do not really compensate anyone, 
Fitzpatrick argues, since minor per capita recoveries for class members 
create no social utility.4  Their only function is deterrence.5
 
†
Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law.  
I am grateful for Brian Fitzpatrick’s patient and valuable reactions to this Response. 
  If 100% 
1
See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
2043, 2046 (2010) (invoking a “social-welfarist utilitarian perspective”). 
2
Id. at 2053. 
3
Id. at 2067. 
4
Fitzpatrick’s argument hinges on the claim that compensatory damages function 
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of the class’s recovery went to counsel as fees, lawyers would have the 
greatest possible incentive to bring small-stakes class actions.  Maxi-
mum deterrence would result at no cost to class member utility.  Fee 
percentages, however, typically hover around 25%.6  Plaintiffs’ lawyers 
thus eschew a possibly meritorious case when its expected litigation 
costs exceed 25% of its expected aggregate value.  Potentially valuable 
deterrence never materializes from these (mostly quite small) cases.7
Fitzpatrick writes so lucidly that his article’s many strengths speak 
for themselves.  His discussion of the functions that small-stakes class 
suits do and do not play is particularly interesting, and he elegantly 
pivots from this analysis to his utilitarian case for higher fees.  But 
questions remain.  Does existing doctrine permit courts to award the 
class’s entire recovery to class counsel?  Has Fitzpatrick made a suffi-
cient utilitarian case for his proposal?  Is utilitarianism the best nor-
mative guide for fee awards in aggregate litigation?  In my opinion, 
the answer to each is no. 
  If 
the entire recovery in these small-stakes suits went to class counsel, courts 
could minimize this suboptimal result. 
I.  DOCTRINAL DIFFICULTIES 
Does existing law permit courts to award counsel 100% of the 
class’s recovery?  Fitzpatrick does not frame the issue quite this way.  
He acknowledges that such awards might be legally difficult to render, 
and in the end recommends that lawyers earn “as much as legal and 
political constraints permit.”8
 
as a form of insurance.  Id. at 2058.  Because individuals are not risk averse with respect 
to small losses, they would not purchase insurance to protect against such losses.  Id. at 
2067-68.  As I understand the logic, because these individuals would not purchase in-
surance ex ante, there is no gain in social utility if they receive the equivalent ex post 
in the form of damages. 
  But whether 100% fee awards are doc-
trinally possible is a useful question for two reasons.  First, although 
5
Id. at 2068. 
6
Id. at 2046. 
7
One hundred thousand dollar fee requests are not difficult to find.  E.g., Vas-
quez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 482, 492 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (approving a 
$100,000 fee request when the proposed settlement for the class equaled $300,000); 
Hopson v. Hansebrands Inc., No. 08-0844, 2008 WL 3385452, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 
2008) (conditionally certifying a settlement class under terms including “up to 
$100,000 maximum . . . to attorney fees”).  Taking this figure as the minimum a plain-
tiffs’ lawyer needs to expect in order to file a class action, Fitzpatrick’s proposal would 
incentivize lawyers to file cases worth less than $400,000 (25% of which is $100,000) 
and cases worth more than $400,000 but involving unusually high litigation expenses. 
8
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2079 (emphasis omitted). 
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his focus is primarily theoretical, Fitzpatrick does suggest, albeit guar-
dedly, that applicable law might permit such fees.9
Fitzpatrick addresses several doctrinal challenges to his proposal, 
but two merit more examination than he provides.
  Second, if existing 
doctrine permits only a partial implementation of Fitzpatrick’s pro-
posal, then the theoretical rigor his analysis promises for fee awards 
loses some of its luster. 
10  The Rules Enabl-
ing Act (REA)11 poses the first challenge.  Fitzpatrick believes that 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h), which licenses “reasonable” fee 
awards in class actions,12 permits courts to do what he urges.13  But the 
REA prohibits rules of procedure that “abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right,”14 and this limitation might preclude an interpreta-
tion of “reasonable” to include such all-encompassing fee awards.  An 
order giving the lawyer everything would effectively assign class mem-
bers’ claims to their counsel without their consent.  Doctrine that re-
gulates claim assignment is substantive law,15 and the Federal Rules 
themselves may not modify these assignments.16  Although the issue is 
quite complicated,17
 
9
See id. at 2076 (arguing that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
“might permit judges to award fees as high as they wish”); id. at 2077 (analyzing statu-
tory fee caps and concluding that “it is not clear that these caps would prevent judges 
from awarding fees consistent with deterrence-insurance theory”); id. at 2077-78 (re-
viewing the Erie -Hanna doctrinal implications of state statutory fee caps and suggesting 
why Rule 23 might preempt them).  
 Rule 23(h) might violate the REA’s substantive 
rights limitation if applied in the manner Fitzpatrick desires. 
10
Fitzpatrick mentions the unjust enrichment issue briefly.  Id. at 2075 (noting 
that “the common law of unjust enrichment . . . might not permit” 100% fee awards). 
11
28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2077 (2006). 
12
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h). 
13
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2047-48, 2075-76 (noting that a 100% fee award 
could be permissible if state-law caps are preempted, and could be considered reasona-
ble in light of the broad discretion vested in district court judges in approving fee awards). 
14
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
15
See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 83 (4th 
Cir. 1973) (“Whether a plaintiff is entitled to enforce the asserted right is determined 
according to the substantive law.”); Payne v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., No. 08-0199, 2008 WL 
4890764, at *1 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2008) (same); 6A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1545 (4th ed. 2010) 
(theorizing that substantive law relating to the assignment of claims is the basis for the 
real-party-in-interest rule). 
16
See Stichting Ter Behartiging Van De Belangen Van Oudaandeelhouders In Het 
Kapitaal Van Saybolt Int’l B.V. v. Schreiber, 407 F.3d 34, 49 n.14 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The 
procedural mechanisms set forth in Rule 17(a) for ameliorating real party in interest 
problems may not, under the Rules Enabling Act, be employed to expand substantive 
rights.” (citation omitted)). 
17
For example, it is uncertain whether as-applied challenges to the Federal Rules 
are permitted.  See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity, 
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Second, the doctrinal source for class counsel fees might not allow 
Fitzpatrick’s proposal.  Concerns of unjust enrichment—or the fear 
that class members would enjoy a windfall at an attorney’s expense—
justify courts using their equitable power to tax a class’s recovery for 
fees.18  This “common fund” doctrine allows fees when “the classes of 
persons benefited by the lawsuits ‘[are] small in number and easily 
identifiable,’” when “‘[t]he benefits [can] be traced with some accu-
racy,” and when “‘there [is] reason for confidence that the costs [of 
litigation can] indeed be shifted with some exactitude to those bene-
fiting.’”19  A class action that makes no pretense of compensation 
might deter, but society at large, not just class members, would enjoy 
better defendant behavior in the future as a result.20  A case without a 
small and readily identifiable class of beneficiaries, and featuring only 
the “vindicat[ion of] a general social grievance,” could not legitimate-
ly result in a fee award.21
Fitzpatrick criticizes the “indeterminate multifactor test[s]” courts 
presently use to calculate fees as unprincipled,
 
22 and in contrast he of-
fers a normative justification for a 100% fee award.  But if the REA or 
unjust enrichment problems would require some significant down-
ward departure from this percentage, I question whether courts using 
his utilitarian analysis and giving lawyers “as much as they can”23
 
and As-Applied Challenges Under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forth-
coming 2011) (discussing how the Supreme Court left the question open in Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010)). 
 would 
in the end award fees in any more theoretically robust a manner. 
18
See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (“[T]his Court has rec-
ognized consistently that a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the 
benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s 
fee from the fund as a whole.”). 
19
Id. at 478-79 (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 
240, 263-67 & n.39 (1975)); cf. Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 790 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(interpreting Van Gemert for the requirement that a case must “result in the creation of 
a fund to be divvied up among the plaintiffs” to justify a fee award). 
20
Deterrence likely would not be readily quantifiable and thus could not justify a 
fee award.  See Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 974 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
because the value of injunctive relief is difficult to quantify, it can only rarely be in-
cluded in common fund calculations). 
21
Van Gemert, 444 U.S. at 479. 
22
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2053. 
23
Id. at 2083. 
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II.  UTILITARIAN PROBLEMS 
Has Fitzpatrick made a sufficient utilitarian case for his proposal?  
I have two doubts.  First, fee awards of the ilk Fitzpatrick prefers might 
cause a net deterrence loss.  His proposal would apply in all cases in-
volving minor per capita recoveries.24  But a case’s aggregate value de-
termines whether the game is worth the candle for the plaintiffs’ law-
yer.  As a recent case illustrates, potential damages of three dollars per 
class member would hardly thwart litigation if the case as a whole 
might win $9.5 million.25  Fitzpatrick’s proposal might produce a 
greatly diminished settlement in this sort of case.  Presently, if an at-
torney wants $2.5 million in fees, she must obtain a $10 million set-
tlement.  But if the lawyer gets 100% of the recovery, a $2.5 million 
settlement would earn her the same amount.  The defendant could 
take advantage of class counsel’s higher rate of return and discount a 
settlement offer by $7.5 million.  A risk-averse plaintiffs’ lawyer might 
accept such an offer, and there are reasons to think that risk aversion 
would be likely in this context.26
I also doubt that Fitzpatrick has made the utilitarian case for more 
lawsuits.  The expectation of larger fees might fuel litigation, and with 
it, the more robust enforcement of the substantive law.  A utilitarian 
would applaud this result only if, to quote Fitzpatrick, “the substantive 
law correctly assesses damages for the claims on which small-stakes 
class actions are based.”
  Whatever additional deterrence the 
eschewed $7.5 million might have created vanishes.  The small cases 
Fitzpatrick’s proposal would generate might engender some deter-
rence, but I am not sure it would counterbalance this loss. 
27  The obvious problem is that the substantive 
law might not optimally deter litigation.28
 
24
See id. at 2066 (embracing the idea that “courts should not lower fee percentag-
es no matter how large the aggregate class recovery may be”). 
  But Fitzpatrick argues that 
this concern should not militate against his proposal.  If full enforce-
ment of the substantive law does not maximize utility, “the proper re-
sponse” is not to deter litigation with inadequate attorney compensa-
25
See Class Action Settlement Agreement at 31, In re Classmates.com Consoli-
dated Litig. (W.D. Wash. Mar. 12, 2010) (No. 09-0045), available at 
http://www.cmemailsettlement.com/sa.pdf. 
26
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability:  Reconciling Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 390-91 (2000) (discussing 
the diminishing marginal utility of class counsel compensation). 
27
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2070. 
28
See id. at 2071 (noting that overdeterrence may result if the substantive law does 
not accurately assesses damages). 
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tion but “to confront [the] problem directly by changing the substan-
tive law.”29
Fitzpatrick distinguishes too rigidly between substance and proce-
dure.  His idea seems to be that, once a right exists in the substantive 
law, all nonsubstantive (or procedural, to use the term expansively) 
barriers to its full vindication are pathological.
 
30
But, as a descriptive matter, social utility does not fall so exclusive-
ly in the substantive law’s bailiwick.  Governments regularly use pro-
cedural devices to fine-tune the regulatory force of the substantive 
law.
  Put more weakly, the 
idea is that the substantive law has sole responsibility for optimizing 
social utility. 
31  Indeed, legislatures may well create substantive rights with an 
appreciation for the nonsubstantive barriers and facilitators that help 
determine their real-world impact.32  At the least, this claim is no less 
plausible than the contestable notion that the substantive law itself 
strives to maximize social utility.33
 
29
Id. 
  If both claims are true, then an on-
slaught of small-stakes class actions sparked by the sudden decision to 
quadruple attorneys fees would significantly distort the intended regu-
latory effect of the substantive law and the optimal deterrence it os-
tensibly seeks.  As a normative matter, I know of no convincing argu-
30
Fitzpatrick’s late colleague, Richard Nagareda, thoroughly expounded upon 
this idea.  See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents:  Class Settlement Pres-
sure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1888 (2006) (discuss-
ing the concerns around settlement pressure arising from substantive law). 
31
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1450 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that states traditionally refine substantive 
law through the use of procedure).  For example, at least twenty-three states have laws 
that restrict the use of class actions to enforce particular rights.  See Brief for Respon-
dent at app. B., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (No. 08-1008) (listing the 
state statutes limiting the availability of class actions).  In addition, the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, (1991), provides for jury trials and shifts 
the expert witness costs of a prevailing plaintiff to the defendant in order to enhance 
the regulatory effect of Title VII.  See Sean Farhang, Congressional Mobilization of Private 
Litigants:  Evidence from the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 11-12 
(2009) (describing the procedural changes that Congress enacted as a direct response 
to a line of cases that had narrowed the scope of substantive rights conferred by the 
statute).  One could easily multiply the examples. 
32
See Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch:  The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity 
and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1929 (2006) (noting that legislatures frequent-
ly are aware of the procedural background against which they legislate). 
33
But see, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance:  Implications of Pub-
lic Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 283 (1988) (summarizing 
the public-choice critique of legislation). 
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ment for why the achievement of optimal utility cannot depend in 
some measure on nonsubstantive barriers and facilitators. 
If responsibility for social utility does indeed lie both with the 
substantive law and the complex of nonsubstantive forces that affect 
its implementation, then the argument that plaintiffs’ lawyers should 
have the maximum incentive possible to litigate all potential class suits 
needs more utilitarian grounding.  Fitzpatrick must at least explain 
why financial disincentives to litigate class actions should not help de-
termine the optimal level of deterrence. 
III.  PROBLEMS WITH UTILITARIANISM 
Does utilitarianism provide the proper normative metric for fee 
awards?34
If plaintiff compensation in small-stakes class suits is worthless, 
then the current fee-award doctrine resembles other aspects of class 
action law that burden cases with costs and yield little benefit.  These 
aspects include, for example, the individual notice and opt-out re-
quirements in small-stakes money damages class suits.
  An alternative metric, rooted in the perceived social legiti-
macy of the class action, can justify existing practices and better pro-
tect the class-suit device against attempts to enervate or destroy it. 
35  The require-
ment that a class action have a named plaintiff is also arguably point-
less from a cost-benefit perspective.36
If one assumes that these ostensibly inefficient requirements per-
form some valid function, they challenge utilitarianism as a complete 
normative guide for the law of aggregate litigation.  Letting a case 
proceed without a named plaintiff likely would not change its out-
come and hence would not affect any deterrence value it might have.
 
37
 
34
Fitzpatrick rightly acknowledges that the persuasiveness of his proposal hinges 
upon whether one shares his utilitarian outlook.  Fitzpatrick, supra note 
  
1, at 2058. 
35
For a discussion of notice, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:  Economic Analysis and 
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1991).  For a discussion of opt-
out rights, see David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions:  
Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 35-46.  Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Governance 
and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 367-68 (discussing the 
“limited utility” of opt-out rights in suits with low-value claims). 
36
See Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads:  Eliminating Class Representatives in 
Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165, 165-66 (1990) (arguing that the elimination of the 
named-plaintiff requirement would improve consistency and encourage courts to focus 
on the real issues in aggregate litigation). 
37
The named plaintiff in a small-stakes class suit has little incentive to monitor 
class counsel.  See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 35, at 5, 19-20 (describing the sys-
temic and practical barriers to a lead plaintiff’s ability to monitor effectively under 
these circumstances); Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitor-
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But a spate of clientless cases would underscore the charge, quite de-
trimental to the class action’s social legitimacy, that class litigation 
enriches lawyers and does nothing for class members.38
The recent experience of cases settling for coupons illustrates how 
an asymmetric distribution of the recovery between class members 
and their counsel can create problems of social legitimacy.
  Money dam-
ages suits without opt-out rights might imperil the device similarly. 
39  The 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), part of which addressed 
such distributions, has been the most significant legislative attack on 
class actions since their recreation in 1966.  Prior to its enactment, 
courts often based attorneys’ fees on the aggregate face value of cou-
pons distributed (their nominal value), not their redemption rate 
(their real value).40  This tendency meant that counsel often earned 
much more than 25% of the recovery.  For example, a fee award of 
$150 million amounts to 15% of a $1 billion settlement if class mem-
bers actually use the coupons the settlement awarded them.  But if 
class members redeem only 10% of the coupons, a $150 million fee 
award represents 64% of the settlement’s real value.41
In the years leading to CAFA’s passage, the class action weathered 
significant criticism due to the great imbalance between the often 
worthless coupons that class members received and the sizeable fees 
their attorneys reaped.  From the very first congressional hearing on 
the bill
 
42
 
ing:  How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE 
L.J. 2053, 2064-65 (1995) (noting that many of the constraints clients place on lawyers 
are not typically present in the class action context). 
 to the last days of debate in the Senate and the House eight 
38
E.g., Stephen Labaton, Senate Approves Measure to Curb Big Class Actions, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 11, 2005, at A1 (quoting Charles Grassley, chief sponsor of the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005 (CAFA) as critiquing “a class-action regime that many times serves no one but 
the lawyers who bring these class action lawsuits”). 
39
Fitzpatrick’s determination that the average fee award amounts to 25% of the 
class’s recovery does not account for these settlements.  See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Em-
pirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
811, 831 (2010) (acknowledging that a calculation of fee percentages does not reflect 
“indefinite cash relief” or “noncash relief”).  
40
Compare Christoper R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in An-
titrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1059-60 (2002) (dis-
cussing how judges have been encouraged to believe that face value is equivalent to 
true value), with THOMAS A. DICKERSON, CLASS ACTIONS:  THE LAW OF 50 STATES 
§ 9.03[1], at 9-39 to 9-40 (2005) (“In evaluating the merit of a non-cash settlement, the 
only proper means of measuring true value is by estimating the actual redemption rate.”). 
41
The numbers for this hypothetical are based on the settlement in Shaw v. Toshi-
ba American Information Systems, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942 (E.D. Tex. 2000). 
42
Class Action Lawsuits:  Examining Victim Compensation and Attorneys’ Fees:  Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2-3 
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years later,43 the statute’s supporters invoked the large fees that ac-
companied worthless coupons as evidence of a “broken”44 system that 
produced “outrageous decisions.”45  The corporate interests pushing 
the bill disingenuously invoked the issue for helpful political cover.46  
As enacted, CAFA began with an ironically named “Consumer Bill of 
Rights,” which included a provision meant to link attorney compensa-
tion to actual class member recovery,47 even as its central provisions 
were intended to weaken class actions brought to enforce consumer 
and other state law protections.48
To the extent that the votes a bill wins are a window into social le-
gitimacy, the strong bipartisan support that CAFA enjoyed suggested 
some problems along these lines for the class action.
 
49  Fitzpatrick’s 
proposal would result in settlements with no pretense of class member 
compensation and thus risks an even greater threat to the class ac-
tion’s health than that posed by coupon settlements.  To an extent, he 
recognizes these dangerous shoals, conceding that “it would be politi-
cally difficult” to implement his proposal.50
The bounds of this Response do not permit a thorough explora-
tion of social legitimacy as a normative principle for aggregate litiga-
  Such a backlash might be 
thought to reflect a failure to appreciate the utilitarian realities Fitzpa-
trick describes.  Alternatively, taken as communicating something 
about what legitimates the class action, the backlash might gesture to-
ward an alternative normative source that can justify some class action 
requirements that resist a cost-benefit rationale. 
 
(1997) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
43
See 151 CONG. REC. S1235 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Sessions) 
(expressing concern over the role of plaintiffs’ attorneys in shaping settlement terms); 
see also 151 CONG. REC. H727 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2010) (statement of Rep. Boucher) 
(discussing the gap between fees and actual plaintiff recoveries).  
44
151 CONG. REC. H737 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2010) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee). 
45
151 CONG. REC. S1226 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Vitter). 
46
Cf. Class Action Fairness Act of 2003:  Hearing on H.R. 1115 Before the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 33 (2003) (statement of Brian Wolfman, Staff Att’y, Public 
Citizen Litigation Group) (“[T]he corporate community’s use of stories about coupon 
settlements to drive the class action debate drips with irony . . . . [D]efendants love 
coupon settlements . . . .”). 
47
See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2006); see also Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Herr-
mann, The Class Action Fairness Act:  An Ill-Conceived Approach to Class Settlements, 80 TUL. 
L. REV. 1695, 1698-705 (2006) (critiquing CAFA’s coupon-settlement provisions). 
48
See, e.g., David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Im-
plications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1252 (2007) (comment-
ing on the federal courts’ hostility to state-law causes of action that led to the drafting 
of CAFA). 
49
The Senate passed CAFA by a vote of 72–26, and the House by a vote of 279–149.   
50
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2075. 
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tion.  I can only suggest how it might justify the current fee practices 
Fitzpatrick finds unprincipled.  The individual action, based in the 
“deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day 
in court,”51 enjoys such a solid foundation of social legitimacy that, at 
least presently,52 American law only grudgingly permits deviations 
from this ideal.53
If mechanisms to mitigate the deviation from the individual action 
ideal help entrench the social legitimacy of the class action, then the 
tendency to award 25% of the class’s recovery to counsel is not un-
principled but makes ample sense.  This fee schedule roughly approx-
imates what one might expect in an individually negotiated, contin-
gency fee representation agreement.  If it saddles class litigation with 
costs-–a set of particularly small class suits that do not get filed–-
perhaps, like individual notice and opt-out rights, it also promises cer-
tain legitimacy benefits that in the end strengthen the overall vitality 
of the class action.  Even a utilitarian, I would think, might find this 
result attractive. 
  Sometimes, as with small-stakes class suits, individual 
control over claims has to yield to practical realities.  But this depar-
ture is disquieting.  Mechanisms that preserve, to the extent possible, 
the individual-action ideal without unduly compromising the practical 
benefits of claim aggregation act as a corrective of sorts.  Hence an at-
tempt to let class members at least know that they are plaintiffs (indi-
vidual notice), a device to preserve at least a modicum of individual 
control over claims (opt-out rights), and the fiction that an injured 
party, as in an individual action, initiated the suit (the named plaintiff 
requirement). 
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51
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-93 (2008) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 
517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
52
Cf. Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 209-18 (1992) (discussing the demise of traditional “interest repre-
sentation” practice during the twentieth century). 
53
See Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 893-95 (discussing six exceptions to the general rule of 
nonparty preclusion). 
